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Constitutional and Institutional Structural Determinants of Policy
Responsiveness to Protect Citizens from Existential Threats: COVID-19 and
Beyond

Abstract:
A multitude of government forms and institutional variations have the
same aims of serving their countries and citizens but vary in outcomes. What it
means to best serve the citizens is, however, a matter of broad interpretation
and so the disagreements persist. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic creates
new metrics for comparing government performance – the metrics of human
deaths, or, alternatively and as we pursue it here, the metrics of the speed of
government response in preventing human deaths through policy adoption.
We argue in this essay that institutional and government systems with
more authority redundancies are more likely to rapidly generate policy in
response to crisis and find better policy solutions compared to centralized
systems with minimal authority redundancies. This is due to a multiplicity of
access points to policy making, which increase the chances of a policymaker
crafting the “correct” response to crisis, which can be replicated elsewhere.
Furthermore, citizens in centralized and unitary governments must rely on
national policymakers to get the correct response as subnational policymakers
are highly constrained compared to their counterparts in decentralized systems.
As policy authority is institutionally defined, these policy authority
redundancies correspond to specific institutional and constitutional forms. In
this paper, we provide a mathematical/formal model where we specifically
analyze the contrast in the speed of policy response between more centralized
and autocratic states versus democratic federations.
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Beyond

Politics is all about strategy, and institutions are all about incentives to the strategic
agents of politics. That is not our focus in this essay, however. Here, we evaluate the baseline
capacity of political systems that the institutions specify to avert policy error in an existential
emergency, where all their citizens are immediately threatened, like in the onset of the COVID19 pandemic.
1. Policy responsiveness in an emergency
A multitude of government forms and institutional variations compete around the world
in terms of best serving their countries and citizens. What it means to best serve their citizens is,
however, a matter of broad interpretation and so the disagreements persist. The COVID-19
pandemic created new metrics for comparison of governments’ performance – the metrics of
human deaths, or, alternatively and as we pursue it here, the metrics of the speed of government
response in preventing human deaths through policy adoption (Pueyo 2020).
We argue in this essay that institutional and government systems with large authority
redundancies have a greater capacity to generate a quick policy response than systems with
centralized policy authority because of their ability to error-correct. Furthermore, belief update
mechanisms and technology-experience evidence operate at a greater pace in high authority
redundancy systems as compared to centralized authority systems. Redundancy generally
indicates that multiple organs in the system have the ability to take over the functions of failed
components either without diminishing the resulting performance of the system or not
3
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diminishing it catastrophically (Charbonneau, P. 2017, Haimes 2018). For policies, this means
that policies of subnational governments can serve as adequate substitutes for their constituents
for the absent policies of the national government, and vice versa.
As policy authority is institutionally defined, structural redundancies in policy authority
correspond to specific institutional and constitutional forms. While such correspondence cannot
be considered absolute, and informal rules as well as reaching a specific ‘balance’ in authority
legitimacies can influence the presence of redundancies (see, e.g., Breslawski 2020, Mershon
and Shvetsova 2019a, 2019b), we here explore the comparison of democracies and autocracies as
higher- versus lower-redundancy policy mechanisms. Because of the independence of many
public agencies and the norms of public accountability, we take a democracy to be a more policy
redundancies-rich environment than autocracies. Here we argue that democracies generally, and
federal democracies in particular, increase redundancy in policy authority by separately
empowering agencies and administrators whose accountability is broad and public. This gives
democracies the mechanism of ‘policy rescue’ by bypassing the events of ‘signal’ error in some
information chains via parallel information chains that also supply information to the national
political leadership. Democracies also partially disperse policy authority to independent and
semi-independent policy agencies. Policy authority is further dispersed in federations, where
governments at multiple levels have broad overlap in jurisdictions for policy-making. The main
feature of federations and other decentralized polities is the existence of multiple layers of
government that overlap in their jurisdictions. In the language of complex systems, federations
have not only the ‘overlap’ (when only some actions can be taken in several places but others are
monopolized), but also ‘duplication’ (where everything can be done everywhere in the system)
(Dekker 2016). In such systems, each citizen can expect support from at least one government
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operating in each of those layers, and the officials operating those governments have mandates
(and electoral incentives) to offer such protection.
Illustrative here is the relative timing in the US and UK policy responses during the
crucial period of late January-March of 2020, when the spread of COVID-19 was still possible
initially to contain, and later to substantially reduce. Both nations’ leaders adopted similarly
dismissive stances during the initial phase of the pandemic, yet while Johnson’s position closely
corresponded with his country’s policies, Trump’s views coexisted in time with significant
strong COVID policy response from sub-national authorities and public agencies (Shvetsova et
al. 2020).
2. System Redundancies and Policy Authority
Scholarship on system redundancies in complex systems dates back to the seminal work
by Von Neumann on reducing error in information processing in automated systems, or the
“synthesis of reliable organisms from unreliable components” (Von Neumann 1956).
Fundamentally, assuming that error in a receiving signal will occur with some independent
probability in every receiving component, it would reduce the rate of failure of the system to act
on the signal if multiple components in it are collecting and processing the incoming
information. Since then, it has become the point of consensus that a systems’ ability to
adequately withstand various shocks, including external attacks, depends on the system’s
topology (Newman, Barabasi, and Watts 2009), which in the case of government networks is the
way in which the receiving and processing of information into decisions is institutionalized.

5
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Political institutions, such as constitutions and more, set up systems of policy authority,
which vary substantially across the globe. Political processes arising from such institutions are
characterized by authority structures ranging from extremely centralized to extremely diffused.
Furthermore, surpassing the redundancies as described in automatic systems and at par with
distributed degenerative biological complex systems (Edelman and Gally 2001), redundancies in
policy authority structures extend beyond information processing and into what is called the
overlapping jurisdictions – the ability of multiple semi-autonomous ‘organs’ to produce the same
policy response. This is akin to an alarm going off separately in the fire station and the police
department, with both sets of responders showing up on the scene independently. Indeed, in the
case of overlapping jurisdictions, the alarm effectively goes off in several police stations at once
and all of them are obligated to respond to the scene independently of each other. Though
arguably some efficiency may be lost in the latest scenario, the reliability of getting someone to
show up quickly is increased.
3. Authority redundancies from Overlapping Policy Jurisdictions Improve Policy
Responsiveness to Emergencies
When the system of government has multiple points of access to generating policy
response, like in federations, the timing of appropriate policy response in a crisis situation is on
average faster as compared to a system with centralized policy authority. Schematically, we can
represent the extremes in authority systems’ levels of redundancy as autocracy (totalitarianism)
on the one end of the spectrum and democratic federalism on the other. Unitary, centralized
democracies can be tentatively placed in-between.

Constitutional and Institutional Structural Determinants of Policy Responsiveness to Protect Citizens
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Figure 1 depicts the policy response to new information in fully centralized authority
structures. One ‘organ’, at the top, receives new information, ‘signals’, and makes policy
decisions. As the ‘signal’ arrives, there is a probability of error in whether it actually reaches the
decision-maker or is lost. Notice, that the decision-maker itself does not add the probability of
error, and accurately reacts to the message that it received: either ‘signal’ or ‘no signal.’ This is
to say, that the policy maker is assumed to know exactly what to do and be motivated to do just
that in response to the signal of a public emergency – all politicians are perfect in this rendition.
In the schematics in Figure 1, the probability of policy error for the fully centralized policy
authority thus equals the probability of signal error.
[Figure 1 is here]
Figure 2 is a schematic representation of centralized but democratic policy making. It is a
multiplex system, where multiple receptors independently attempt to receive the signal. Again,
there is positive error probability, or as put by Von Neumann, “with every basic organ is
associated a positive number ε such that in any operation, the organ will fail to function correctly
with the (precise) probability ε. This malfunction is assumed to occur statistically independently
of the general state of the network and of the occurrence of other malfunctions” (p.62). In this
system, multiple ‘organs’ have a say, as each independently receives the ‘signal,’ each with
probability 1-ε, which we assume to be the same probability as in Figure 1. The inputs are then
aggregated via some institutional rule, for example, simple majority, and that information state
directs the policy decision that single Authority, A, will produce. Unless ε is too high, or the
level of consensus required for action is too demanding, a multiplex will reduce signal error
7
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relatively to the centralized system as in Figure 1. Policy error here is still the same as final
signal error, but reduced from the base signal error which is exogenously set by the environment.
[Figure 2 is here]
Figure 3 represents the federal structure. Instead of aggregating information according to
some institutional rule, each ‘organ’ receiving the signal has a decision-making function, each
constituting a separate policy authority. These policy authorities coexist insofar as their
jurisdictions overlap, i.e., when either one of them can produce the policy that covers citizen i.
Because the same policy function is performed by either one or all of these decision-makers, the
system like this has policy redundancies built in. In the language used for biological systems, the
system is degenerate.
[Figure 3 is here]
Political institutions and political process of federalism generate systems of overlapping
jurisdictions, as in Figure 3. Our model below pertains to the institutional form of overlapping
jurisdictions. Federations also have non-overlapping jurisdictions, policy-making when restricted
to which amounts to centralized policy making in a multiplex system (as in Figure 2) applied to
disjoint subsets of the country’s population. We do not incorporate this feature in the model. We
also exclude for simplicity the multiplex nature of inputs that various policy authorities with
overlapping jurisdictions might each rely on. While this is certainly an important aspect to
further explore in the future, e.g., when comparing inputs from centralized versus federalized
specialist agencies, this is beyond our current scope.
4. Redundancies in policy authority and independent learning
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To give our model an intuitive interpretation, suppose that the emergency is the COVID19 pandemic and the policy that is appropriate upon receiving the ‘signal’ is a stay-at-home
order. Once such signal is sent – once the information is available that extreme epidemiological
measures are necessary (perhaps obtained from observation and research of an outbreak
elsewhere in the world) – our presumed automaton-policy makers who receive the signal
automatically do what is needed. Those that receive the signal, perfectly adhere to their public
mandate and at the earliest opportunity issue the stay-at-home policy. Each policy-maker
receives the signal (conditionally in the signal going out) with the probability 1-ε.
In order to evaluate redundancy-based advantages in system responsiveness, we compare
responsiveness in the centralized authority schema in Figure 1 with the federal schema in Figure
3. Specifically, our comparison is aimed at the probability of policy error as experienced by a
sample citizen served by each of these authority systems. Policy error as experienced by a citizen
is the outcome for a citizen of a likely deadly infection in the context of a failing healthcare
system, if we follow the same COVID-19 pandemic interpretation.
Formally, we denote the set of all governments in a polity as 𝐺, and its subset, the set of
all governments responsible for protecting a representative citizen 𝑖, as 𝐽𝑖 ⊆ 𝐺. According to our
definition, federal polities are characterized by the set 𝐺 having at least three elements and the
set 𝐽𝑖 having at least 2 elements. We will assume for present purposes that in unitary states, |𝐺| =
|𝐽𝑖 | = 1. This makes our theorized unitary state quite stylized, as of course in reality multiple
administrative levels exist there as well, with varying policy prerogatives delegated down to

9
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them in different nations. This also takes out of the consideration by the unitary democratic
model the potential policy authority of public agencies.
Each government, 𝑗𝑖 ∈ 𝐽𝑖 , independently from other governments, monitors the
environment for the threats to the citizen 𝑖. Once a threat is on the horizon, they try to learn as
much as possible about it and make a policy according to the severity of the threat. Here we will
focus on a single threat with true severity 𝜃 and assume that this variable can only take values of
0 and 1. We also assume that there are only two types of policies a government can choose:
protect and not protect, 𝑃 = {0,1}, and that this policy will affect a citizen if and only if the
citizen is in that government’s jurisdiction.
Assuming that automaton-authorities process received signals perfectly and adopt the
subsequent policy error-free, we construct the base model of a governments’ learning and
reaction. As a government sets out to investigate the threat, it randomly (and independently from
other governments) samples the body of evidence. We assume that the body of evidence consists
of the messages of two types – the ones suggesting that the threat is severe (𝜃 = 1), true
messages. The other type are the messages suggesting that the threat is not severe (𝜃 = 0), or
erroneous messages. The proportion of the messages that correctly reflect the true state generally
depends on the true state. Here we assume that the proportion of the erroneous messages is ε,
with ε ∈ (0, 1). That is, the pool of evidence necessarily contains both accurate and inaccurate
messages. If the true message is that the threat is high, 𝜃=1, then the probability of receiving the
message that the threat is low is ε.
Formally, denote the message that government 𝑗 selects from the pool as 𝜇𝑗 ∈ {0,1}.
Then from the assumptions above,
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Pr(𝜇𝑗 = 1|𝜃 = 1) = 1 − ε ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽
For now, we assume out the ability of the government to choose a reaction. Each
government is programmed to act upon the first message it picks from the pool of evidence and
to choose protective policies if this message suggests that the threat is high and non-protective
policies if the message suggests otherwise. To state formally, 𝑝𝑗 (𝜇𝑗 ) = 𝜇𝑗 .
Proposition 1. If citizen 𝑖 is facing a severe threat, the probability that he will receive
protection is (1 − ε𝑚 ), where 𝑚 = |𝐽𝑖 |.
𝑗

Proof: Denote the event that government 𝑗 protects citizen 𝑖 as 𝑄𝑖 . Since a government’s
response does not affect the citizens outside of its jurisdiction,
𝐶
𝑗

𝑗

⋃ 𝑄𝑖 = ⋃ 𝑄𝑖 =
𝑗∈𝐺

𝑗∈𝐽𝑖

𝑗 𝐶
(⋂(𝑄𝑖 ) )
𝑗∈𝐽𝑖

𝑗 𝐶

Since 𝑝𝑗 (𝜇𝑗 ) = 𝜇𝑗 , Pr ((𝑄𝑖 ) |𝜃 = 1) = Pr(𝜇𝑗 = 0|𝜃 = 1) = ε. Since the messages
sampled by governments are independent from the messages sampled by other government,
𝑗 𝐶

Pr (⋂𝑗∈𝐽𝑖 (𝑄𝑖 ) |𝜃 = 1) = ∏ Pr(𝜇𝑗 = 0|𝜃 = 1) = ε|𝐽𝑖 |
𝑗∈𝐽𝑖

Thus, the probability that the citizen 𝑖 receives protection from any government 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑖 is
𝑗

𝑗 𝐶

Pr(⋃𝑗∈𝐺 𝑄𝑖 |𝜃 = 1) = 1 − Pr (⋂𝑗∈𝐽𝑖 (𝑄𝑖 ) | 𝜃 = 1) = 1 − ε𝑚 ,
where 𝑚 = |𝐽𝑖 |, the number of layers of government with a mandate to protect citizen 𝑖. □
11
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Corollary 1. A citizen is more likely to enjoy protection from threats in a decentralized
polity than in a unitary state.
𝑑

Proof: By assumption, 0 < ε < 1, therefore 𝑑𝑥 (1 − ε𝑚 ) = − ln(ε) ε𝑚 > 0 and 1 −
ε𝑚 > 1 − ε ∀ 𝑚 > 1. □
Notice once again that by assuming that decision makers are automatons, Proposition 1
implicitly assumed that all politicians are the same: honest, educated, hardworking, and decisive.
Also that they all have their constituents’ full mandate to protect them from the extreme public
health threat.1
The probability that the correct signal would reach somebody and inform policy-making
in at least one layer of government with jurisdiction over citizen i is 1 − ε𝑚 , which is greater
than the unitary government probability of 1 − 𝜀. A citizen in a federal democracy is more likely
to receive a public health policy that would protect her than a citizen in a unitary democracy or in
an autocracy. Of course, since Proposition 1 applies to a single information period, this
conclusion also applies to a single information period. In the next period, the next ‘signal’
arrives, and governments that made an error in period 1 will have an opportunity to correct their
policy choices then, or possibly even later.
5. Policy dissemination in diffused authority structures
Policy dissemination occurs through beliefs update: observing the policy response in peer
jurisdictions helps a politician to make the right choice. Politicians can learn how real the threat
is by observing how other politicians are responding. In other words, they can update their

1

This result parallels the results for generally specified “performance levels” in Bender (1985, p. 46-48).

Constitutional and Institutional Structural Determinants of Policy Responsiveness to Protect Citizens
from Existential Threats: COVID-19 and Beyond

beliefs by watching each other. This is important, because the actions of other policy makers
indicate which type of signal those policy makers have received.
In the model that we specified in Figure 1, there are a lot of certainties. If a politician
manages to receive the signal to act, we assumed she knows with probability 1 – with certainty –
that her information is accurate. We also assumed that she enacts the policy with probability 1 if
she received the signal, and with probability 0 if she did not. This all is sufficient for another
politician, who has previously failed to act, to update her beliefs to a certainty that action is
necessary, when she observes at least one among the rest of jurisdictions adopting the policy.
In our model, adoption of a strict policy indicates that the received signal was that such
policy is necessary. In our model, also, we already know that the signal is a true one. In a more
general specification, a politician does not know that for a fact, so she weighs her information
critically. In line with the automaton analogy, we must allow for the possibility of different
machines having different built-in biases for their response. We assumed no biases toward
information of a particular type or from a particular source, but the decision-maker may in fact
be “built” with such a bias. Besides, even if one’s own signal is missed, observation of what the
other governments have done may affect policy correction even without any additional new
signals. We show below, that the direction of the update from observing a peer politician
implementing a strict policy is towards implementing a similarly strict policy in own jurisdiction,
too.

13
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A slightly more complex model of learning and decision allows to capture these
additional benefits of policy authority redundancies. In this model, we assume that each
government is a Bayesian decision-making automaton.
Governments share some prior beliefs that will affect not their perception of the threat
itself, but of the necessity to respond to the threat, should it arise, with a protective policy. We
assume that these beliefs are biased, in the signaling sense, meaning that they are consequential
in decision-making because of putting a higher probability on the “rightness” of one course of
action over another. Substantively, this action prior, 𝜙0 , might have been determined by the
constituency’s and government’s past history, recent policy episodes, the way its healthcare
system prioritizes public versus private health, etc. We will interpret this probability 𝜙0 as the
predisposition of politicians to perceive the threat, 𝜃 = 1, as an epidemiological threat requiring
some government-led public health response rather than treat it as a matter for doctors and
patients.
As before, governments randomly and independently from each other sample the
messages about the threat 𝜃 = 1 from a pool of evidence that contains 𝜀 proportion of false
messages.
In order to account for the individual biases of a government, we add a parameter that
describes each government j’s perception of each information source, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 , where K is a set of
all information sources. Specifically, we define 𝛦̂ as a set of probability distributions for each
government over their individual (thus subjective) “trust” in each specific information source.
Each “trust” probability function, 𝜀̂𝑗,𝑘 , returns government j’s subjective probability of
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dismissing the signal 𝜃 = 1 if its source is k. This assumption is just a complication on our
previous discussion, where it was in effect assumed that all 𝜀̂ were similar and equaled ε.
Further assume that each government accrues political benefit 𝑏 > 0 if it shields the
citizen in time of crisis. The cost of the protective measures, including their political cost, is 𝑐 >
0.
In Stage 1, the government learns and makes a policy determination based on the
message that it received on its own. Assuming that the government’s prior beliefs are not enough
to push them into action regardless of the signal, such as for example maintaining strict public
health protocols just because that would be a good precaution to do so and so should be their
standard operating procedure, that government’s prior is such that
1 − 𝜙0
𝑏−𝑐
>
𝜙0
𝑐
The cost-benefit condition for whether the protective measures will be implemented only
by the governments that drew cautionary messages and only if
1 − 𝜙0 𝜀̂
𝑏−𝑐
<
𝜙0 1 − 𝜀̂
𝑐

(1)

As long as condition (1) is satisfied, Proposition 1 also holds for this model of decisionmaking. If the threat is real and condition 1 holds citizen 𝑖 will be protected with probability
(1 − ∏𝑗∈𝐽𝑖 𝜀̂𝑗,𝑘 (𝑘)), which is greater than any individual 𝜀̂𝑗,𝑘 .
From condition (1), the critical factors of the decision-making include the distrust to the
evidence that the government receives, the relative costs of implementing the protective
15
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measures and the value of human life, as well as the prior beliefs about how appropriate it is to
respond to the threat with policy in addition to medicine.
In Stage 2, governments in addition can observe the policies if those are adopted by other
governments in the polity. Suppose once again that error probabilities are perceived similarly by
all governments, i.e., that 𝜀̂𝑗,𝑘 = 𝜀̂ 𝑘 , the prior is neutral, and that the cost-benefit calculus is such
that every government responds if the message it received is 𝜃𝑘 = 1. Then given the share of
faulty messages in the pool of evidence, they will expect to observe ⌊|𝐽|(1 − 𝜀)⌋ strong policy
responses, and ⌊|𝐽|𝜀⌋ governments that do not issue a response. With these data, the updated
beliefs about the severity of a threat in this much simplified set up, as long as 𝜀 < 1/2, and the
true state of the world is 𝜃𝑘 = 1 – the threat is in fact severe, the protective policy is likely to
fully propagate in such a system even to the governments that did not receive the correct
message, in which case the probability that citizen i receives policy protection after the first
signal becomes 1.
If we return to the story that some governments are more cautious about the evidence
than others and that some governments’ costs of implementing protective measures (relatively to
the value of a citizen’s health) are higher than others’, some may not implement the policy even
if they observe the signal that 𝜃𝑘 = 1. Assume for example that

𝑏−𝑐
𝑐

follows a continuous

distribution with probability function 𝐹(∙), and that the prior in 𝐽 is once again biased. In this
case, the probability that a citizen gets protected is

𝑗
Pr(⋃𝑗∈𝐺 𝑄𝑖

|𝜃 = 1) = 1 − (𝐹(𝑥))

|𝐽𝑖 |

1 − 𝜙0
𝜀̂
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥 =
(
)
𝜙0
1 − 𝜀̂

⌊|𝐽|(1−2𝜀̂ )⌋

(2)
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From equation (2), the chances that a citizen is protected increase with the number of
governments in the polity and with the number of layers of the government.
6. Conclusion
An order like shelter in place is a very costly policy to the constituents, is very disruptive
to lifestyles and to the economy, and it is also a type of policy that needs to be implemented
early, prior to the public actually witnessing how high the health costs of not doing so would
become. Thus an honest politician would not issue such an order unless she received a signal
(information) that would clearly require such drastic response. (In truth, even a dishonest
politician has no incentives to rush such an order because, if done right, the public would be
protected from the virus and not experience health-related losses, affected only by the economic
losses from the protective measures).
Thus even while limiting the present enquiry to the structural institutional capacity for
quick policy response, we can speculate that multiple access points to policy-making can lead to
cost reductions. The ability to observe and compare efficacy of multiple alternative solutions to
the same underlying problem would lead to the improvement of the technology of policy
response as policy-makers correct their choices to adopt the higher-performing solutions
(Weingast 1995). Late adopters face lower administrative cost from policy design and
implementation, as they can learn from the experience of success and failure of policy elements
in the early-adopter jurisdictions.
Another form of cost – the political price to pay from the fallout from the disgruntled
constituents is also reduced, as they observe multiple decision-makers responding to the same
17

Citizenship, Rights, and Cultural Belonging WORKING PAPER No. 104, May 2020

signal and so can update their own beliefs regarding whether the policy in their locale is truly
justified.
Furthermore, as additional information continues to arrive, and either repeats or
strengthens the original signal, policy correction becomes more and more likely even in a fully
centralized authority structure. If the same signal is simply repeated, that gives a politician
another chance to receive it. If a new, stronger signal is sent, the chance that the politician will
receive it now is higher than in the previous period with a weaker signal. Stronger signals can be
interpreted as signals sent by more authoritative sources (the message is thus better heard), or
more sources reiterating the same message (the message is louder).
As we assess the benefits of structural redundancies, it is only right to acknowledge that
these come with potential efficiency losses. Aside from operating and electing multiple
governments, extra costs might be accrued from policy inefficiencies due to replicating efforts
within jurisdictions and such things as outbidding for resources (though see Bendor 1985). There
may arise enforcement inefficiencies due to inter-jurisdictional policy discrepancies, along with
‘arbitrage’ opportunities for economic agents who operate across jurisdictional borders.
Additional resource limitations might come from implementing a policy at a government level
either below or above that which would be optimal for the task. Even the policy designs
themselves may be inferior from the outset sue to the severity of the budget and resource
constraints in isolated jurisdictions. And inconsistency in policy articulated for the same
constituents by different levels of government may have not only enforcement, but also
legitimacy implications.

Constitutional and Institutional Structural Determinants of Policy Responsiveness to Protect Citizens
from Existential Threats: COVID-19 and Beyond

A very important structural consideration that could be added further is the “quality” of
the automaton which we assume the decision-maker is. Continuing the machine analogy, both
processing and decision –making capacity may be high or low as that machine’s pre-set
characteristic.
While many more features of institutional and decision-making structures could be
brought into analysis, our conclusion here makes possible the baseline comparison. In the short
term, constitutional regimes with greater authority redundancies have the structural capacity to
offer citizens faster protective policy response from new uncertain threats. Thus when not weeks,
but days and even hours count, such systems have the structural capacity to save more lives.
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Figure 1. Centralized Authority System
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Figure 2. Multiple Inputs Authority System (centralized democracy)

ε

signal
signal

‘majorizing’

ε

A

signal
signal

POLICY
A

ε

i

ε

23

Citizenship, Rights, and Cultural Belonging WORKING PAPER No. 104, May 2020

Figure 3. Multiple Policy Authority System (federations)
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